Warriors Without a War: Defending OOTW

by Lieutenant Colonel Wray R. Johnson

It has been axiomatic since the United States' founding that the Armed Forces' peacetime mission is to prepare for the next war. Since the mid 1980s, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, joint doctrine has required the Armed Forces to prepare "for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war."[1]

In the editorial introduction of the January 1988 *Military Review*, Major General Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Commander, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), later Army Chief of Staff, notes that the military is "charged" by the doctrine, not only with the preparation of forces for war, but also in operations that do not constitute war.[2] In that respect, Sullivan contends that the military would have to redefine its role in an environment where the use of force would be "dominated by nonmilitary considerations." In his lead article in the same *Military Review* issue, Colonel Richard Taylor, director, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, CGSC, sketches the contours of operations short of war: "Such operations are interdepartmental, political, economic and informational [and] undertaken to carry out strategic or tactical tasks to attain political purposes and to frustrate those of an adversary in an environment of routine, peaceful competition or [low-intensity conflict (LIC)]."[3]

Since the 1991 Gulf War, the United States has intervened militarily in five "invitational crises" that did not constitute war. Two crises—Kurdistan and Rwanda—manifested "armed humanitarian intervention." Two others—Haiti and Bosnia—amounted to "nation building." In Somalia in 1993, armed humanitarian intervention transmogrified into nation building—with disastrous results. The cumulative effect of these operations other than war (OOTW) on US national security policy and strategy, therefore US military strategy, has been substantial.

This article examines the impact of peace support and humanitarian operations on the US military within the context of the evolving strategic environment; the origin and nature of institutional resistance to these operations; and the implications for military doctrine, force structure and readiness. This examination suggests some interesting questions. What are the roots of US military strategy and doctrine? What are the parameters of peace support and humanitarian operations that comprise OOTW? Is the institutional heritage of the Armed Forces reconcilable with OOTW requirements?

This essay posits that the US military's conventional heritage and predisposition will remain intact and drive decisions affecting doctrine, force structure and readiness and, therefore, affect the Armed Forces' ability to effectively conduct OOTW missions. A corollary position is that effective employment of general-purpose US forces in OOTW can be achieved through conceptual innovation. To begin to understand this dynamic, as well as arrive at any conclusions and recommendations, the questions must be placed in historical context.

OOTW and the American Way of War

Russell Weigley, in his benchmark work *The American Way of War,* writes that Prussian military and political theorist Carl von Clausewitz is the author of American military strategy.[4] The Clausewitzian paradigm narrowly focuses on using military means in war as the shortest route to attaining political objectives—achieving victory through maximum concentration of force in decisive battle. "The military power [of an enemy] must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a state as not able to prosecute the war."[5] Although Clausewitz acknowledges the importance of other means, they are subordinate to military means.

Clausewitz's theory of war has deep roots. In a remarkably insightful, but often overlooked, book, *The Western Way of War,* Victor Hanson argues persuasively that the Western democratic heritage and the concept of decisive battle are two sides of the same coin.[6] The origin of the Western military ethos—and by extension the American military ethos—is traceable to 5th Century BCE [before common era] Greek phalanx warfare "where men in the West first drew themselves up in dense formation, charged, killed . . . , then died."[7]

In effect, the Greeks developed an ethos in which warring city-states contracted among themselves to meet at an agreed-on field of battle, fight to a decisive conclusion and not yield the battlefield until one or the other side was broken. Hanson argues that this "pitched-battle" concept has been brought forward to the present as "the only way to defeat an enemy"; that is, to "find and engage [the enemy] in order to end the entire business as quickly as possible" to restore the natural state of peace.[8] Consequently, "the Greek way of war . . . developed in us a distaste for what we call [the] guerrilla, or irregular, who chooses to wage war differently and is unwilling to die on the battlefield in order to kill the enemy."[9]

Given this institutional heritage, US military doctrine has concentrated on the principles of war as derived from this ethos, refined by Clausewitz and subsequently elevated to near-holy writ. For example, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations,* the Army's basic combat doctrine, has always been

Clausewitzian to its core.[10] Historically, US Air Force doctrine has emphasized such Clausewitzian principles as mass, offensive and economy of force to the extent that critics such as historians Larry Cable and Earl Tilford claim American defeat in Vietnam was a direct outgrowth of Army and Air Force inability to shed their conventional Clausewitzian traditions.[11]

Beginning with Vietnam, a discernible pattern emerged with respect to US response to conflicts short of war. Such conflicts are seen as significant and peculiar threats to US interests. In response, analysts demand a qualitatively different approach to such threats outside the main stream of conventional warfighting principles. A contest is engaged between "small wars" doctrinal adherents and "big war" traditionalists. Although the former achieve some measure of success in altering doctrine and force structure, success invariably is fleeting as traditionalists reassert Clausewitzian principles. In the end, the conventional mind-set of the US military is reaffirmed, and the theory and doctrine of limited warfare recede into a doctrinal backwater until the next foreign internal conflict demands center stage and restarts the cycle.

The 1960s' paradigm was counterinsurgency (COIN). In the 1970s, it was internal defense and development (IDAD). The 1980s' paradigm was LIC. In the early 1990s, the OOTW paradigm emerged. OOTW's genesis was the Soviet empire's collapse and the resultant geopolitical environment transformation. After 1989, the equilibrium that superpower competition afforded was replaced by regional and localized conflicts borne of internal strife characterized by ethnicity, culture and religion as opposed to ideology.

Sergei Baburkin, an assistant professor of international relations in Russia, provides perhaps the most incisive interpretation of this metamorphosis. He argues that since the end of the Cold War the "use-of-force" dyad between the United States and the Soviet Union has reversed.[12] Before 1989, US policy was to use force to further national security objectives—in particular, "containment" of Soviet expansionism. After 1989, US policy evolved to using force to advance democratic values. For the Russians, policy shifted from the use of force in defense of values—communism—to national-security-based use of force-protection of "Mother Russia" and Russian national interests in the "near abroad."

The renewed US emphasis on former US President Woodrow Wilson's idea of "crusading for democracy" has since found its clearest expression in President Bill Clinton's national security policy of "engagement and enlargement." Early in his administration, Clinton made it a central tenet of his strategy to participate "in multilateral efforts to broker settlements of internal conflicts."[13] Specifically, US forces were to "participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other [humanitarian] operations" in support of democratization efforts worldwide.[14] These operations comprise the core of over a dozen missions manifesting OOTW doctrine.

As defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,* peace operations are military operations supporting political settlement through diplomatic effort.[15] Peacekeeping operations are ostensibly neutral and undertaken with the consent of disputing parties. Peace-enforcement operations are inherently non-neutral and apply military force to compel compliance with international resolutions or sanctions and do not require consent. Humanitarian operations are intended to relieve or reduce the impact of natural or manmade disasters and may be facilitated by military force.[16]

In 1992, Somalia energized the debate about the nature of *interventionary* operations. (For purposes of clarity and brevity, the term "interventionary operations" is used to collectively describe peace-support and humanitarian operations.) Following the collapse of Somalia's government, the United Nations (UN) invoked Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*, declaring the situation a threat to international peace.[17] Extant LIC doctrine, predicated on enhancing the established government's legitimacy, was useless in a failed state where no government existed. Therefore, doing what comes naturally, US forces conducted tactical operations in the absence of an overarching nation-building strategy.[18]

As direct-action operations took precedence over humanitarian relief in the October 1993 attempt to apprehend the elusive Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed—the designated enemy—Army Rangers leapt headfirst into an ambush. The disastrous consequences forced the withdrawal of all intervening forces from Somalia.

The Somalia debacle profoundly affected the debate about future interventionary operations. The principal issue was on the question of whether force structure should be modified to reflect the new strategic and operational environment. Some analysts asserted that Somalia-type operations required specially tailored and trained forces. Traditionalists maintained that the most important lesson to be learned in Somalia was simply the need to adapt conventional forces to "methods of operations that can cope with multidimensional challenges that go far beyond conventional warfare."[19] Subsequent operations, especially in Haiti and Bosnia, would exacerbate the debate.[20]

Haiti highlighted the perceived decline of the nation-state and the purported demise of the concept of sovereignty in the post-Cold War geopolitical structure. According to one study, "The old norm was 'no intervention without consent. . . .' Since 1989, UN practice has changed without realizing a change in norms. Many interventions that would be illegal under the traditional norms are fitted into categories that permit intervention. Domestic [that is, internal] conflicts are portrayed as threats to international peace and security, thus justifying intervention."[21]

Bosnia revealed the inchoate nature of emergent OOTW doctrine in the context of the continued reliance on the Clausewitzian paradigm in mainstream US military strategy. Asked to analyze the Serbs who might oppose US intervention, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

remarked: "We don't know if they're Iraqis or Viet Cong."[22] The implications were straightforward. The Iraqis fought an American-style war and lost. The Vietcong responded asymmetrically and defeated the American war machine.

Aspin voiced the concern of many military officers that Bosnia was a conundrum of the worst sort, an ethno-religious conflict manifested in warring factions not unlike the clans and subclans of Somalia. As the 19th-century French military theorist Antoine Henri de Jomini lamented, wars originating in religious or ethnic conflict are the "most deplorable for they enlist the worst passions and become vindictive, cruel and terrible."[23] He warned, "No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such resistance unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself."[24]

The Post-Cold War Era—Beyond the Intended Purpose?

In 1994, Congress chartered a commission on US Armed Forces' roles and missions to examine whether the services were prepared to meet emerging threats. In May 1995, after a year of study, the commission delivered a comprehensive report which concluded that "America's future will be marked by rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets and a broad range of missions to support evolving national security policies."[25]

The question regarding the military role in OOTW was not whether US forces would participate—Clinton's national security strategy answered that question—it was whether and to what extent the Armed Forces should be reconfigured to operate in OOTW without degrading their core warfighting mission. The question's import was acute, for as had occurred in the 1950s and 1970s, the Armed Forces of the 1990s were undergoing a major drawdown. Over a period of five years beginning in 1990, the services were reduced by one-third to a level comparable to that of 1939. Baburkin correctly notes that at the same time, their mission had changed from strictly warfighting to promotion of American values abroad.[26]

As was the case before US intervention in Vietnam, the services answered this question in 1995 by claiming they were capable across the spectrum of conflict—operational continuum—without force structure changes or the creation of special units dedicated to interventionary operations. A research report prepared for the Army concluded that "it makes most sense to conduct military operations other than war with existing forces, [and] forces should not be earmarked for peace operations nor should new forces be created."[27]

Victory in Operation *Desert Storm* in 1991 convinced US military leaders that force structure and AirLand Battle doctrine were sound. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, the Department of Defense (DOD) argued that a conventionally arrayed force, implementing AirLand Battle doctrine, could defeat any enemy and adapt easily to interventionary operations.[28]

Major General S.L. Arnold, commander, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Somalia, complained that *mission creep*—a derivative of "broad mission statements with unclear end states"—was the principal culprit in the apparent poor showing of US forces in OOTW.[29] Arnold concluded that OOTW doctrine was valid, arguing simply that greater attention be paid to ad hoc specialized training in support of interventionary operations."[30] Not surprisingly, Arnold also concluded that "well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions."[31]

The Armed Forces' reluctance to reconfigure to meet OOTW demands stems largely from readiness concerns in an era of declining budgets and reduced force structure. In essence, the argument is that any specialization attendant to participation in interventionary operations detracts from true military readiness. For one thing, despite the record of repeated participation in such operations abroad, adequate separate funding has not been provided for OOTW missions. To offset such operations' costs, the services draw on operations and maintenance accounts of units that are not deployed. In turn, these units curtail training, defer maintenance and atrophy in terms of warfighting capabilities. Perhaps of more importance, interventionary operations require a mind-set at odds with warfighting. Consequently, these missions divert organizational focus and training away from the core mission.

Such arguments are not wholly without merit. However, with respect to degradation of a unit's capability to perform its core mission, a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) report proffered a paradox—participation in peace operations can provide excellent experience for combat operations, but participation can also degrade a unit's warfighting skills.[32] According to the report, the extent of degradation depends on many factors, such as the mission's nature, the type unit involved, duration and opportunities for training in-theater.[33] Nonetheless, when degradation occurs, six months or more may be required for recovery.

Interventionary operations also impose other penalties related to operational tempo—wear and tear on equipment as well as strains related to personnel issues.[34] Therefore, it is generally agreed that the longer a unit participates in an interventionary operation, the more adverse the impact and the more extensive the restoration requirements. Consequently, owing to the fundamental contention that OOTW missions are collateral to a unit's primary warfighting mission, the services assert that combat expertise takes precedence over noncombat skills. They further insist that combat training take precedence and other training be handled as mission-specific and episodic. Thus, in the main, the services largely dismiss the contrast between warfighting and OOTW as an exaggerated premise. To that end, JP 3-07 asserts that OOTW "principles are [simply] an extension of warfighting doctrine."[35] Given this fact, subordinate doctrine similarly dismisses any stark distinction be-

tween OOTW and warfighting and takes pains to illustrate the utility of conventional concepts in interventionary operations.[36] Therefore, so the argument goes, the principles of war dating back at least to Clausewitz—and, arguably, to roots in 5th-century BCE Greece—apply to OOTW as well as war.

Clausewitzian Implications in OOTW

The net effect of the conscious decision to retain the Clausewitzian tradition in the context of a changed international security environment is considerable. With respect to national security strategy, there is general agreement that the geostrategic setting has changed dramatically, and the security challenges of the bipolar world have been replaced by a single superpower pursuing a policy of "engagement and enlargement."[37] Thus, according to current (1997) national security strategy, a central objective is "to promote democracy abroad."[38] Not surprisingly, this entails continued participation in multilateral interventionary operations. Such operations support US national interests described as "vital, important and humanitarian."[39]

As for vital interests, a credible warfighting capability remains paramount. Regarding the lesser interests, particularly humanitarian, military force is to be employed within the OOTW construct. In that light, the decision to retain a conventional force structure capable across the operational continuum appears valid. It is certain that the decision is cost effective. In the Army alone, commitment to specialized "peace forces" would require a force structure approximating two mechanized divisions, amounting to roughly 50,000 soldiers. Supporting extended operations in several geographic locations would require perhaps twice that many.[40] Earmarking such forces across the services would increase that number by a factor of four.

Simple mathematics leads even the casual observer to conclude that such earmarks are not tenable. In 1985, DOD's budget amounted to $400 billion dollars, approximately 6 percent of the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By comparison, the 1997 budget was reduced by 33 percent, to $250 billion dollars, or just over 3 percent of the GDP. Troop strength was similarly reduced by 33 percent, from a 1985 high of 2.2 million to roughly 1.45 million in 1997.[41] Since 1991, the Army has reduced force structure from 18 divisions to 10. The Navy went from 546 ships to 350. And the Air Force eliminated 16 fighter wings. The 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* calls for an additional cut of between 50,000 and 60,000 personnel.[42] As a result, the Air Force may be compelled to eliminate two additional fighter wings, leaving only three wings more than served during the Gulf War.[43]

When one considers that national military strategy retains a posture calling for the capability to fight two near-simultaneous, major regional contingencies (MRCs), it graphically underscores why the services are unwilling to dedicate units "out of hide" for interventionary operations—hence the decision to retain the conventional configuration of the Armed Forces and the attendant claim that general-purpose forces are capable across the operational continuum, including OOTW.[44] The question then becomes one of OOTW missions' impact on readiness. Research by the GAO indicates participation by a unit can, in the short run, enhance mission capability but that extended deployment eventually erodes warfighting skills. The challenge is to maximize the productive aspects of participation in interventionary operations, yet manage involvement in a manner that reduces corrosive effects.

Beyond readiness, two issues remain: what are the risks of interventionary operations, and will conventional orientation without specialized training prove effective in the context of political-military operations where "settlement"—as opposed to "victory"—is the aim and where negotiating skill is valued above combat expertise? The risks are fairly self-evident. As the pundit Charles Krauthammer points out: "The first law of peacekeeping is that when you have real peace, you don't need peacekeepers"; the second: "Where there is no peace, sending peacekeepers is often a disaster"; the third: "Americans make the best targets."[45] The latter has led to what many in the Pentagon refer to as the "Aideed model." For example, if an irregular force can kill a significant number of Americans and have the images broadcast on American television, domestic public opinion will force the withdrawal of US forces. The net effect of such a withdrawal is loss of international prestige and credibility and the impediment of the US pursuit of national interests.

A more abstract, but equally crucial, question is whether and to what extent the Armed Forces can resolve the paradox of conventional configuration and orientation with interventionary operations' peculiar nonmilitary requirements. For example, a senior officer serving in Bosnia remarked, "This is a strange mission. . . . They didn't train me for this."[46] Major General William Nash, 1st Armored Division commander, similarly remarked that he had trained for 30 years to read the "battlefield." The implementation force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia required him to read a "peace field."[47] The result was unbalancing.

Not surprisingly, many analysts are concerned that a repeat of Somalia-type action could easily occur in other interventionary scenarios. They fear that another operation will experience the same kind of mission creep that resulted in the death of 18 Army Rangers in Mogadishu. Casualties are what US military commanders fear most in OOTW. According to Nash, "If my Achilles heel is the low tolerance of the American people for casualties, then I have to recognize that my success or failure in this mission is directly affected by that."[48] Nash's superior, Lieutenant General John Abrams, US Army 5th Corps commander, adds: "It's the nature of the mission."[49]

In the final analysis, it is the American public's concept of OOTW, and the collective calculation of costs and risks versus benefits, that will drive political decision makers regarding future interventionary missions. As current national security strategy states: "The United States cannot long

sustain a commitment without the support of the public."[50] Nevertheless, national security strategy focuses on "shaping the international environment," and this means responding to crises with an ability to perform successfully in interventionary operations.[51] Despite the US military's doctrinal disposition, the American people's support is the deciding factor.

Historically, Americans are willing to sacrifice in the pursuit of well-defined and self-evident interests. If those interests are ill defined, consensus regarding the merits of foreign intervention is diminished. As former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger notes in his six tests for foreign military intervention, congressional support—reflecting public support—is equally critical.[52] The problem for military doctrine and strategy is that consensus regarding intervention is a political issue, not a military-planning consideration.

In terms of doctrine specifically, perhaps the best illustration of the preeminence of the Clausewitzian paradigm, even in OOTW, is the 1996 final draft of FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*.[53] FM 100-20, arguably the most mature expression of US theory and doctrine for limited conflict over the last 35 years, admits "the Army [is] not designed for stability and support operations, [but the doctrine encourages commanders to] adapt their thinking to unfamiliar purposes and methods"—that is, those peculiar requirements manifested in OOTW.[54] Most important is "mental agility, [expanding] the range of operations into unfamiliar realms and the imagination to use Army capabilities for purposes for which they were not designed."[55]

Encompassing the entire spectrum of theory and doctrine for COIN, IDAD, LIC and OOTW, dating back at least to the 1940s' Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual,* the emergent doctrine in FM 100-20 highlights the fundamental distinction between stability operations and conventional warfare.[56] "The goal in war is to destroy an enemy's will and capability to fight. . . . By contrast, military stability and support operations act as a damper on political violence, reducing the intensity of conflict and establishing an environment of security conducive to settlement through political, economic and informational means."[57] Combat operations are only applicable in the sense that they "contribute to suasion [and] facilitate diplomacy."[58]

Thus, where draft FM 100-20 breaks with former limited-warfare doctrine is in the recognition that, although the theoretical ideal is the primacy of the political, the reality is the predisposition of the US Army (and all of the services) to conduct conventional warfare.[59] Consequently, doctrine correctly attempts to reconcile the paradox by encouraging commanders to consider innovative means to adapt conventional warfare principles to unconventional conflict. Whether or not this framework will succeed remains to be seen, but it is an honest attempt to bring doctrine and drill in agreement. It is this aspect of current military thinking that is most encouraging with respect to defining military operations in the post-Cold War era.

OOTW's Future

Sun Tzu wisely counseled: "If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight."[60] Nevertheless, the United States has historically intervened overseas where and when necessary, and not always with calculated objectives in mind. And, it is fairly assured that the future will realize continued and, perhaps, more interventionary operations as we pursue unilateral and multilateral objectives in consonance with our national interests across the globe. Moreover, it is also reasonably certain that the US Armed Forces' conventional bias will remain implacable. As evidenced by the notion that AirLand Battle is applicable to limited warfare as much as general war, the US military considers small wars to be "war writ small." However, given the success of IFOR and the apparent continued success—at least in the military context—of its successor, stabilization force (SFOR), this does not necessarily portend failure in OOTW.

In the end, the most fundamental doctrinal change required for interventionary operations has always been conceptual rather than operational. However, in the context of such doctrinal dissonance between the theoretical and the practical, it is not surprising that the US record of moderating or ending foreign internal conflicts in the 20th century has been poor.

As draft FM 100-20 contends, conceptual innovation; that is, using conventional capabilities in an unconventional fashion, is the first step to realizing a credible capacity to employ general purpose forces in an environment generally involving conflict less than general war.[61] In Bosnia, for example, when it became clear that the level of conflict had been reduced to a "manageable" level, Nash removed the bulk of M1A1 tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and other heavy equipment and replaced them with high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), which almost tripled his ability to patrol northwestern Bosnia. In so doing, he took a "reductive" approach to military operations in OOTW as opposed to the Clausewitzian principle of mass. But increased coverage achieved "saturation" patrolling, which constitutes mass in an interventionary sense.[62]

In the end, the key is to capitalize on force-enhancement aspects of participation in interventionary operations while retaining combat capability. For example, one important aspect of the interventionary mission is to operate in built-up environments. Development and acquisition of technology suitable for force protection in urban operations will serve interventionary operations as well as war.

Concomitantly, integrating existing and new technologies under operational doctrine developed specifically for interventionary operations will have a complementary impact on similar operations in war. Furthermore, protection for personnel in armored and unarmored vehicles from mines, rocket-propelled grenades and other antiarmor weapons in OOTW is similarly useful in war. And, duality of utility is not limited to ground forces. It is axiomatic that

crises stress command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) capabilities in all services. In fact, it can be argued that the less "military" the crisis, the greater the need for effective C^3I. Thus, any improvements in C^3I will prove beneficial to each service across the operational continuum.

Adequate infrastructure is also important. In interventionary scenarios, as much as in general war, large amounts of materiel must often be moved great distances. Such movements depend on "lift" capability as well as terminal facilities for handling, transhipment or distribution. Enhancements to the latter capability and additional lift—as in an increase in airlift and sealift force structure—will prove critical to victory in war as well as success in interventionary operations.

Educating and training military personnel in support of interventionary operations arguably offers the greatest potential for return on dollars invested. Arnold notes that "tactical operations" were the bulk of his mission-essential and battle tasks in Somalia.[63] These operations included air assaults, cordon and search, patrolling, tactical motor marches and others. According to Arnold, every aspect of military operations, from tooth to tail, was tested in a tactical sense, from brigade-size combat operations to squad-size patrols and convoy escort.

Modified tactical training for interventionary operations does not necessarily degrade combat expertise and may, in fact, improve tactical skills in such areas as patrolling and convoy escort. From the Air Force standpoint, airlifting the better part of an entire division over 7,500 miles to Somalia exercised aerial port operations not unlike those required in war. Continued support of and training for interventionary operations will only improve Air Force capabilities. In short, the services should recognize the potential to exploit training for interventionary operations as an adjunct for training for war.

Traditionally, Army and Marine Corps units begin training for interventionary operations' unique requirements after being notified of their inclusion. However, several major units have incorporated specialized training for interventionary operations as part of standard unit training. The 3d Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division in Europe include peace-operations scenarios and training as part of their annual training events. Other units, despite the disaster in Somalia, do not currently include peace operations-specific training in annual training.[64] But to realize consistent benefits intra- as well as interservice, it will become necessary to institutionalize training throughout the services, with special emphasis for those organizations and units that shoulder the preponderance of interventionary missions.

OOTW concepts and operational training should be included in officer and noncommissioned officer courses, command and staff colleges, war colleges, professional schools for specific military specialties—especially security forces, infantry, armor and other basic and advanced training programs—as well as joint military education and training programs. Specialized training, scenarios incorporating OOTW mission peculiarities—crowd control, intercultural communications, negotiations—should be included in unit through major command and joint and combined exercises. Currently, US Army Europe includes a peace-operations module in each of its maneuver battalions' annual 21-day Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotations. This model should be duplicated and spread throughout the joint exercise schedule.

Continuing Roles

US forces' continued roles in interventionary operations must be accepted as a given. Operationally, this means the central objective of US military intervention in the post-Cold War era will be to restore peace as the normal condition. This is not a new imperative; the otherwise pragmatic *Small Wars Manual* conveys this salient feature of US foreign policy: "The problem is to restore peace. . . . Consequently, the remedy is found in emphasizing corrective measures to be taken in order to permit the orderly return to normal conditions."[65]

The problem is that in conflict emanating more from ethnic than political origins, peace is usually defined as the restoration of order and the realization of "justice." Order can be imposed, justice cannot. Therefore, peace is a price—not a prize. To paraphrase the philosopher Goethe, disorder is worse than injustice, and the first priority of the intervenor is to restore order. Subsequent "nation building" in the form of juridicial or political and economic reforms must be considered in the context of the unsuitability of US general-purpose forces in that regard. At that point, the unique capabilities of special operations forces—in particular special forces, psychological operations and civil affairs units—must take the lead, albeit backed by robust security forces capable of responding to any threat.

In the end, the US military's interventionary role must be balanced against the need to ensure US forces are prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. The strategic environment calls for an equally transformed US military strategy. Freed of the Cold War straightjacket, the future should be an era of strategic and operational creativity with respect to doctrine and training for interventionary operations. With clear thinking now, as evident by FM 100-20's emergent doctrine, we will be able to respond appropriately to future changes in the calculus of foreign internal conflict, regardless of etiology or manifestation. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), December 1986), 2-1.
2. MG Gordon R. Sullivan, "From the Deputy Commandant," *Military Review* (January 1988), 1, 3.
3. COL Richard Taylor, "What Are These Things Called 'Operations Short of War?'" *Military Review* (January 1988), 5-6.
4. Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press, 1973), 210-12; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* J.J. Graham, trans. Vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 26.
5. Ibid.
6. Victor Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 19, xv, xvi.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993).
11. Larry Cable, *Conflict of Myths* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 136; Earl Tiflord Jr., "The 'New Look' and the Air Force," *Strategy, Doctrine and Air Power*, 7th ed, vol. 1, book 2-lesson 11, "Air Power and Strategy in Vietnam" (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Nonresident Studies, Air University Press, May 1996), 216. Cable, considered by many in DOD to be the most illuminating commentator on the American defeat in

Southeast Asia, is a former adjunct professor at the US Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL. He currently serves as a Visiting Chair of Military Affairs at the US Marine Corps War College, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia, and is a frequent lecturer at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. For Cable, defeat in Vietnam was a consequence of the American emphasis on Clausewitzian positional warfare in a counterinsurgency setting where nonmilitary priorities should have outweighed conventional maneuver operations: "The doctrinal employment of these formations was made more palatable by the assumption that the guerrilla could be fought with the same tactics . . . used to fight a conventional opponent." Tilford, a retired Air Force intelligence officer, similarly argues that the Air Force was unable to bridge the "incongruities" between its own doctrine of massive retaliation "and fighting a limited war."

12. Sergei Baburkin, "The Use of Force by Russia and the United States," *Woodrow Wilson Center Report*, vol. 13, no. 7 (Washington, DC: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1996).

13. Remarks by President Bill Clinton in *Challenges to Democracy in the New Era, Fourth World Conference on Democracy*, 26-27 April 1993 (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy), 73; *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994), i.

14. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 7.

15. JCS, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 June 1995), III-12-13, III-4-5. See also the definitions under "peacekeeping," "peace enforcement" and "humanitarian operations."

16. Ibid.

17. The United Nations, *UN Charter*, Chapter VII, "Peace Enforcement (Military Intervention)," New York, 1945.

18. Maurice Comte de Saxe, *Reveries* [Memoirs Upon the Art of War] (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 162. The US military performed in a manner de Saxe described over 200 years ago: "[In default of knowing] how to do what they ought, [they] are very naturally led to do what they know."

19. Antonia Chayes and George Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 3.

20. US General Accounting Office (GAO), *Peace Operations: US Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda* (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1996), 6; GAO, *Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1995), 1-2. In September 1991, a military junta overthrew elected president of Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide and forced him into exile. Many Haitians subsequently fled the country amid widespread human rights abuses by the military government. In response, the UN passed several resolutions, and in September 1993 authorized the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to facilitate return of the government in exile. UNMIH was prevented from landing in Haiti, and in September 1994, the United States led a UN-sponsored multinational force called Operation *Uphold Democracy* into Haiti. The force achieved its mission in January 1995, establishing a secure environment and allowing for the return of Aristide. In March 1995, an expanded UNMIH was authorized, which included 6,000 troops to replace the multinational force.

In Bosnia, after 37 years of communist rule, President Josip Broz Tito died in May 1989, settinging into motion centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion and economics that precipitated pro-independence movements resulting in secession by Croatia and Slovenia. Fighting subsequently broke out between the various ethnic groups. In March 1992, the Bosnian Muslim majority voted for independence, but the minority Serb population objected and fighting broke out anew. In June 1992, the UN invoked Chapter VII of its charter and authorized intervention as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). As in earlier operations in Somalia, UNPROFOR sought to provide security for humanitarian relief operations and create conditions leading to lasting peace. However, UNPROFOR was ineffective in carrying out its mandate and, in December 1995, was replaced by a US-led intervention force called an implementation force (IFOR).

21. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Changing Norms of International Intervention" (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 March 1995).

22. Georgie Anne Geyer, "When Policy is Driven by Desire," *The Washington Times*, 25 February 1996, B-3.

23. J.D. Hittle, ed., *Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War: A Condensed Version* (Harrisburg, PA: Washington Military Service [*Telegraph Press*], 1947), 47-49. According to Jomini, the best method for managing internal ethnic and religious conflict is to let the conflict remedy itself, for "to attempt to restrain such a mob by force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater." For many observers, US intervention in the Balkans risked injury from such a bomb.

24. Ibid.

25. US Congress, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: GPO, 24 May 1995), ES-4.

26. Baburkin.

27. Vector Research, Inc., *The 21st Century Army Roles, Missions and Functions in an Age of Information and Uncertainty* (Ann Arbor, MI: VRI, 1995), 1, 50.

28. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* [after this, therefore on account of it]—the fallacy of arguing from mere temporal sequence to a cause and effect relationship.

29. MG S.L. Arnold, "'Somalia': An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review* (December 1993), 35, n. 6. Mission creep is the "insidious" expansion of the mission of an intervening force beyond its original stated purpose; that is, enlarging the mission from simple security for humanitarian relief to "nation building." Arnold confesses that mission creep is inevitable: "As the operation developed, we assisted in standing up councils and governments, rebuilt schools and orphanages, conducted disarmament of warring factions, taught English in schools, repaired and built roads and provided assistance in many other ways. Some of this mission creep was directed, some self-initiated."

30. _____ and David Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters* (Winter 1993-94), 23, 13.

31. Arnold, "Somalia," 35. Ironically, Arnold's statement reflects the same sentiment expressed on the eve of direct US intervention in Vietnam when Army Chief of Staff General George Decker claimed: "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas" (Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* [New York: The Free Press, 1977], 80).

32. GAO, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1995), 2-3.

33. Ibid.

34. John Collins, *Military Roles and Missions: A Framework for Review* (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 1 May 1995), Congressional Research Service (CRS)-41.

35. JP 3-07, viii.

36. US Department of the Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, December 1994), iii, v. FM 100-23 contends that conventional tactical operations apply in peace support operations, albeit with some modification: "An example is maneuver in the sense . . . to gain advantage over an enemy." In peace operations, maneuver—a fundamental principle of war—contributes to "achieving situational advantage over a belligerent rather than destruction of an enemy."

37. The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1997), i, 9.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Vector Research, Inc., *The 21st Century Army*, 50.

41. Harry Summers, "Making Everybody Mad," *The Washington Times*, 22 May 1997, A-16.

42. US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 1997.

43. John Hillen, "Kicking the Can Down the Road," *The Washington Times*, 29 May 1997, A-16.

44. Richard Grenier, "Caps in the Air for Two Contingencies," *The Washington Times*, 3 June 1997, A-17. According to DOD, an MRC is one in which US forces face an enemy fielding an army of one million soldiers with between 2,000 and 4,000 tanks. To meet this threat, US forces, at a minimum, must include four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine brigades and Army National Guard enhanced-readiness brigades. To cope with two MRCs, 10 Army divisions would be required, as well as 15 Guard brigades and three Marine expeditionary units reinforced by Marine reserves. Given the fact that the Army has been reduced by over 40 percent—from 18 to 10 divisions—it is understandable that the Army, in particular, is reluctant to dedicate scarce forces to interventionary operations.

45. Charles Krauthammer, "Clinton's Folly," *The Washington Post*, 27 October 1995, A-25.

46. Rick Atkinson, "Warriors Without a War, US Peacekeepers in Bosnia Adjusting to New Tasks: Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint," *The Washington Post*, 14 April 1996, A-1. This remark is attributed to US Army Colonel Gregory Fontenot, commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. A journalist concluded, based on the interview: "Long schooled in the traditional art of fighting war, American commanders now find themselves grappling with political, diplomatic and military demands that go far beyond the martial skills they were taught."

47. Ibid. According to Nash, "It ain't natural; it ain't intuitive. They don't teach this stuff at Fort Leavenworth. . . . It's an inner ear problem. No one feels completely balanced."

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. The White House, *A National Security Strategy*, 10.

51. Ibid., 6.

52. Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 87* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 78-79. According to Weinberger, intervention is appropriate when US vital interests are at stake; committed US forces are sufficient to decisively "win"; the forces committed are provided with clearly articulated and defined political and military objectives; the relationship between US forces and the objectives is continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary; Congress and the American people support intervention and the commitment of US forces; and all other efforts to resolve the problem have been exhausted.

53. US Department of the Army, FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, final draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, April 1996), 1-12.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid; US War Department, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: US Navy, 1940 [Reprinted in 1987 by the US Department of the Navy], 1-9-16; FM 100-20.

57. *Small Wars Manual.*

58. FM 100-20.

59. Ibid.

60. Samuel Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 142.

61. FM 100-20.

62. Atkinson.

63. Arnold, "Somalia," 31. With respect to the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in terms of training, one analyst argues that "peace enforcement is nothing more than peacekeeping with heavy weapons" (Brian Dunn, "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission," *ARMY* (November 1996), 8).

64. GAO, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 18, 23.

65. *Small Wars Manual,* 1-9-16.

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